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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HELEN T. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

I

No.

11110

DONALD J. JOHNSON,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Appellant in this case seeks a new trial in
order to have the matter re-heard by the District Court
with a view toward elimination of the award of the real
property interest.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
There were three hearings held before the same
L"iurt concerning this matter. The first was held on
1

September 21, 1967, the second on October 6' 19"""
u1,
and the third on November 28, 1967. The Defendant
at each hearing was represented by Counsel; however,
the Defendant himself did not choose to appear at the
first or third hearing.
A proposed property settlement agreement was
introduced at the first hearing and signed by the Plaintiff upon her express understanding that Defendant
had no real property to divide.
At the second hearing called by Plaintiff because
of newly acquired information that Defendant actually
had some real property interest at the time of the first
hearing, undisclosed even to his own Lawyer (R-59)
the stipulation was offered by Defendant. The Court
received the Stipulation at that time and permitted the
taking of testimony. In this testimony, it was revealed
that the Defendant had received a Deed from his parents
conveying to him the undivided two-thirds (2/3) interest in and to some real property located in the vicinity
of 3400 South 9th East, which real property had an
evaluaton of at least $26,000.00 (R-66), subject to a
life estate in the parents.
In the afternoon of the second hearing, each of the
parties was advised that the Court was entering its
Decree, substantially in conformity with the settlement
agreement with the additional provision that the Defendant be required to convey to the Plafotiff an undivided one-fourth ( 114) interest in and to the real
property with which he was then vested.
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Shortly thereafter, the Defendant cancelled the
,erdces of his third attorney and hired a fourth attorney,
who now appears of record, (Mr. Quentin L.R. Alston).
}Ir Alston then called counsel for Plaintiff and advised
him that he had been retained on the case; whereupon,
Plaintiff's attorney consented to the withholding of the
filing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree until the Defendant had had an opportunity
to examine them and then present argument in opposition thereto. The parties voluntarily appeared before
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, on an November 28,
1967; arguments were presented substantially as outlined in Appellant's Brief before the same Court. Not
until then were the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decree actually filed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff simply seeks to have the decision
of the Lower Court affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACT
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Defendant
on February 1, 1967. The first Answer was filed by
DANSIE, ELLETT, & HAMMILL, on February
8, 1967, and that counsel withdrew on February 27,
l\lo8. Another Answer was filed by ROBERT M.
~IcRAE, on the 6th day of March, 1967, and that coun-
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sel withdrew on the 3rd day of August, 1967. Thmafter, until the 11th day of October, 1967, the Defendant
was represented by VERNON B. ROMNEY.
The facts upon which the divorce was sought were
briefly these:
The Defendant had left his wife and children and
had gone home to live with his mother some five (5)
years prior to the filing of the divorce. Transcript will
show that this was a rather bizzare arrangement; in fact,
that the Defendant had moved into his mother's bedroom. There is really no contest whether or not the Plaintiff had grounds for divorce, but simply whether or not
the Trial Court would be bound by stipulation of the
parties or whether the Court can look to all of the facts
to determine what could be decreed as fair and equitable.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD
DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN DECIDING
MATTERS OF DIVORCE AND IS NOT
BOUND BY AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.
There appears to be no disagreement whatever
between the parties with respect to the law in the
State of Utah as to discretionary powers of the Court.
The law was laid down in Title 30, Chapter 3, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and the various
4

(lecisions which have followed are completely in line.
We refer not only to the Madsen and Callister Cases,
~ited by the Defendant in his Brief, but also to the
more recent decisions of Mathie vs. Mathie, ( 1961),
(363 Pac 2d 799) and to Christensen vs. Christensen,
(1967) ( 422 Pac 2d 534). In both of those cases, citing
the earlier cases, the Court has stated that the stipulation between the parties is not binding upon the
Court, but should be used merely as a guide. In the
,\Iathie Case the Court further stated that the decision
of the Trial Court would not be upset unless there was
manifest an abuse of discretion.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN ENTERING ITS FINAL DECREE;
ALL THE EVIDENCE WAS BEFORE THE
COURT PRIOR TO ANY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS OR DECREE.
Counsel for Respondent has read the Brief of
Appellant with great care to determine just what it
is that the Appellant is trying to say. The Appellant
in his brief cites the legal principles applicable and
spends at least three pages in an attempt to get around
them.
'Vithout unduly laboring the issues, it should be
stated here by way of argument, that the Findings of
Fact, the Conclusions of Law, and the Decree as entered
were not entered until all hearings and arguments had
been concluded. At the hearing held before the Honor-
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able D. F. Wilkins on the 6th day of October, 19ti7,
the Defendant himself was present then and was allowed
to testify. He was allowed to state his position to-wit
the property which came into his hands came in as hi~
inheritance and, apparently, as a result of some sort
of an argument that was going on between himself
and his sister. Just what light this can throw upon the
matter at hand, we do not know but certainly nothing
further could be adduced by subsequent hearing of
the case. The Defendant was not present at the first
hearing and no stipulation or property settlement agreement was received at that time. As a matter of fact,
it was not received until the second hearing, after
the Defendant himself was on notice as to what was
the purpose of the ~econd hearing-that of determining
what additional weight should be given to the newly
acquired property interest. At that same hearing, the
Court not only took judicial notice of the agreement
between the parties, but also heard the evidence with
respect to this additional property. The Plaintiff might
well argue that she was not given enough of his interest
in the property and that she should, in fact, have re·
ceived at least one-half (I/2) thereof. Simply stated,
the Trial Court had heard all the evidence and in fact,
had heard arguments by the present counsel prior to
entering the Decree. We see no means by which more
evidence or a rehashing of the old evidence could in any
way further enlighten the Court in this matter.
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CONCLUSION
The law is clear with respect not only to the power
oi', hut also to the duty of the trial court to enter its
Decree in accordance with all the evidence before it.
There is also no question but what there was no manifest
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the decision of the
Trial Court should be affirmed. In addition, the matter
should be remanded to the Trial Court for determination of an award to Plaintiff of a reasonable attorney's
fee for the necessary response to this appeal and for
costs.

LOUIS M. HAYNIE
Attorney for Respondent
840 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

7

